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Fed Governor Lays Out Plan to Finance Social
Security and Medicare
Gramlich proposes removing wage caps, extending
retirement age
April 21, 2005 – In what may be the most specific
proposals for this political debate about meaningful reform of Social
Security and Medicare were presented today by Edward M. Gramlich, a
Federal Reserve Governor, who says raise the retirement age and remove
the cap on the wage level for Social Security taxes.
A major point in his speech at Widener University,
Chester, Pennsylvania, is that both programs – Social Security and
Medicare – should be managed under the same criteria. For example, the
taxes for both should be on all wages and the age levels for receiving
benefits should be the same.
“On net, the changes recommended here might improve
the overall balance of Social Security plus Part A of Medicare by about
3.5 percentage points of taxable wages and salaries. These steps alone
are enough to finance Social Security in perpetuity. Or, they could
finance Social Security for seventy-five years and extend the life of
Part A trust fund by about three decades,” Gramlich said.
He noted the problems for Medicare are far worse
than for Social Security but most of the debate and discussion has
focused on Social Security for three reasons:
1. Because of numerous legislated and designated
advisory councils, groups are forced to make Social Security proposals
more often than Medicare proposals.
2. The Social Security numbers are less
daunting—“it is hard enough to deal with unfunded liabilities of $11
trillion, but it is virtually impossible to deal with unfunded
liabilities of $70 trillion.”
3. The changes to Social Security “just involve
money--cutting benefits means cutting someone's defined-benefit pension
payments. Cuts in Medicare, on the other hand, while partly mitigating
financial burdens on the aged, could also involve the much more
difficult question of limiting, or even rationing, health care
treatments. Medicare cuts could be quite literally a life-and-death
affair.”
Gramlich participated in the Social Security debate
earlier as chair of the 1994-96 Social Security Advisory Council.
He chose to skip any discussion of the Bush
proposal for personal investment accounts in the Social Security
program, saying he would “leave aside questions about privatizing Social
Security or "carve out" or "add on" individual accounts.”
“I will focus only on ages of eligibility and tax
rates for both programs,” he said. And said he recognized his proposal
“is only partial, a first step.”
He said he would also skip the difficult questions
about “the structure of Medicare--whether and how to make more use of
economic incentives or rationing.”
In a much more direct manner than often used by
Chairman Alan Greenspan, Gramlich explained his ideas.
His first point was suggesting removal of the
$90,000 cap on taxable wages in Social Security, which he also
recognized as a tax increase. He said this, too, was a first step in
treating the two programs the same.
“Today, Medicare Part A is financed by a 2.9
percent combined payroll tax on all wages, and Social Security is
financed by a combined 12.4 percent combined payroll tax on wages up to
$90,000, a threshold that is increased each year with the growth in
wages,” he explained..
“Let's treat both programs alike by taxing all
wages for both programs,” he said..
He said in part the removal of the cap merely
adjusts for the fact that because of the widening of the income
distribution, substantially more wages are above the cap than in earlier
times. “But the main reason for removing the taxable payroll cap is that
both programs together are woefully underfunded, and this would be a
small step in the direction of fiscal responsibility.”
In addressing benefits, he said, “We already have
two relevant retirement ages for Social Security--the so-called normal
retirement age (NRA), at which an individual qualifies for full benefits
on the basis of his or her earnings history; and the age of early
eligibility (EEA), at which an individual can receive actuarially
reduced benefits. Historically the NRA has been 65 and the EEA has been
62. Recently the NRA has begun slowly climbing from 65 to 67 and is now
near 66, but the EEA has remained fixed at 62.”
He said is a good rationale for raising the NRA
beyond age 67, but also said, “I also think we should raise the EEA at
the same pace.”
There are two reasons:
> As the NRA rises with no change in the EEA,
the actuarial reductions get larger and larger. Pretty soon, benefit
payments at the EEA get pretty low, and what we are thinking of as a
retirement insurance program becomes progressively less so.
> Because of shifting demographics, the country
will just plain need more workers to pay for growing retirement costs.
If all workers were perfectly rational in comparing benefits and costs,
they could possibly decide for themselves when to retire. But study
after study has shown that many workers seem to be highly myopic and
retire at the first instant at which they are eligible for any money at
all from Social Security. In such cases a reasonable policy response is
to nudge workers in the direction of working longer careers by the
simple expedient of moving the EEA up along with the NRA.
He said we should keep the age factors consistent
in both programs. “Confusion already exists because people qualify for
full benefits under Medicare at age 65 and full benefits under Social
Security at an age nearing 66. As the NRA increases for Social Security,
the disparity will widen and the confusion will grow. So at the slowly
rising NRA, I would give full benefits for both Social Security and
Medicare.”
He said early retirement at the EEA, should rise at
the same slow rate as the NRA,
“I would give actuarially reduced benefits for
Social Security and early buy-in opportunities for Medicare. One
illustrative schedule is that individuals might be allowed to buy in to
Medicare by paying, say, 90 percent of the average Medicare costs for
parts A, B, and D once they hit the EEA, 60 percent a year later, 30
percent a year later, and only the standard part B and D premiums when
they fully qualify for Medicare,” he stated.
Recognizing the programs he different he said we
should “proceed cautiously.”
“Medicare is a health insurance program, and health
insurance performs two functions--it mitigates financial loss for
households getting treatment, and it permits households to get health
treatment in the first place. To the extent that the latter motive is
dominant, as it could be for low-income or disabled households, measures
to raise the eligibility age could be problematic. For this reason, it
would be important to provide a generous schedule of buy-in substitutes
for households with low-income or disabled beneficiaries, to encourage
greater use of health care in the years before the NRA. The subsidies
could be offset by surcharges on the premiums for well-off households,
who could more easily afford the buy-in.”
He suggested several ways to make the changes in
the age differences in the programs.
“I begin with the underlying logic for a rising
retirement age. Historically most workers contributing to Social
Security have been males. Males in my grandparents' generation who were
lucky enough to attain age 65 could be expected to live, and collect
benefits, for another thirteen years. Males in my grandchildren's
generation lucky enough to attain age 65 are projected to live another
twenty years. Had the NRA not been raised, this factor alone would have
made Social Security a better deal by almost 60 percent for the younger
generation.
“Obviously there have been many other changes in
society, the economy, and Social Security over this time. But, still, it
is my guess is that if the designers of Social Security had known back
in the 1930s that postwar life expectancies would increase so
significantly, they would have built rising retirement ages into the
system. Of course, when asked, people do not favor rising retirement
ages. But given the various undesirable choices for moving these
programs back toward actuarial soundness, a slowly rising retirement age
seems far and away the fairest across generations.
“One standard for how fast to raise the retirement
age is to invoke life expectancies. Life expectancies at age 65 speak to
the question of how many years into retirement individuals are likely to
collect benefits. Life expectancies at age 20 address the question from
a different perspective--as individuals enter adulthood, we might have
them spend a constant percent of their time in work and retirement.
“The age-65 standard shows that, for males born
between 1875 and 1995, life expectancy at age 65 has increased 7.4
years, an average of 0.6 years every decade. It also turns out that life
expectancy has increased more rapidly for those born in the twentieth
century--over this shorter period improvement has been about 0.7 years
every decade.
The age-20 proportionate standard works out as
follows. In 1940, at the dawn of Social Security, 20-year-old males
could expect to work another 45 years and to live just 1.9 more after
retirement. That is, they could expect to spend 96 percent of their
remaining life in the work force and 4 percent in retirement. Today,
20-year-old males can expect to live another 55.6 years. If they were to
spend 96 percent of that time in the work force, the NRA would be
slightly more than 73. By this standard, the NRA would have advanced 1.4
years every decade.
Health status is also relevant. One measure is the
share of men near death, defined as being in the last two years of life.
In 1960 this share, for men around today's Social Security early
retirement age of 62, was about 6 percent
(figure 2). In 2000, the share of 68-year-old men near death was at
this baseline level of 6 percent. By this health standard, in 40 years
healthy life expectancies have increased 6 years, or 1.5 years per
decade.
One can also consider a broader measure of health
status. Since 1970 the National Health Interview Survey has asked a
direct question about health status. Typically, the proportion of people
describing their own health as fair or poor is taken as a measure of
poor health status. Since the numbers bounce around, I have made
comparisons with trend lines estimated by Cutler, Liebman, and Smyth
(figure 3).1
The trend lines show that, in the mid-1970s, 28 percent of men aged 62
reported that their health status was fair or poor. By the mid-1990s the
28 percent standard was not reached until men were about 73, an
improvement of 11 years in just two decades. By this standard, the
retirement age should increase by a whopping 5.5 years per decade.
These health standards give varying estimates, so
the conclusions are not as tight as for life expectancy. But they
suggest that health standards are improving even more rapidly than life
expectancies. If the retirement age were increased about a year per
decade from the standpoint of life expectancy alone, the increase would
be more rapid from the standpoint of health status. A sensible
compromise would seem to be to raise the NRA and the EEA slightly more
than a year every decade--maybe three months every two years--a pace
slightly slower than the present rate of increase for the NRA. This rate
of increase should be reviewed periodically to adjust to future changes
in health status or life expectancy.
There is one final point. A standard argument
against raising the retirement age is that people are working physically
demanding jobs and are simply not able to continue. Of course, workers
can and do switch careers as they age, or claim early retirement. But it
still makes sense to look at the share in demanding jobs, as is done in
table 3. In 1950, one-fifth of the work force worked in jobs judged
by the Labor Department to be physically demanding. But this share has
dropped an average of 24 percent per decade since then. By 1996 it was
down to only 7.5 percent of workers in physically demanding jobs, and by
the time any of my suggested measures take effect, the share should be
on the order of 3 or 4 percent--not zero, but probably not high enough
to argue against measures to raise the retirement age at a gradual rate.
It is not popular to raise the retirement age.
Workers have a valid desire to consume some of their increasing
productivity in the form of leisure time, or earlier retirement. At the
same time, Social Security and Medicare together pose huge financial
problems. It is also not popular to raise payroll taxes, or to ration
health care. Among very unpleasant alternatives, raising the retirement
age seems to be one of the fairest approaches across generations.
Budget Savings
Let's then take a policy change that raises the retirement age three
months every two years, or 1.25 years every decade, and taxes all wages
for both Social Security and Medicare. How does it stack up?
The tax change is easy to compute. Right now about
85 percent of wages are taxable and this coverage rate is slated to
decline slightly over time. Applying the 12.4 percent tax rate to the15
percent of wages that are untaxed leads to an effective change based on
now-taxable wages and salaries of 2.1 percentage points. This change
more than solves the seventy-five-year Social Security problem (for the
intermediate assumptions), and solves more than half of the
infinite-horizon Social Security problem. It is only a first step, but a
strong one.
Increasing the NRA by three months every two years
would improve the actuarial balance of Social Security by slightly less
than 1 percentage point of taxable wages and salaries. I ignore any
cost-saving effect on Medicare, permitting the early buy-in costs for
low-income households to use up any budget savings from higher premiums
for high-income households whose primary breadwinner is just over 65. If
we were to combine this increase in the retirement age with a few
standard measures to improve the horizontal equity of Social
Security--including all newly-hired state and local workers and using a
chained price index--the total improvement reaches about 1.4 percentage
points.
On net, the changes recommended here might improve
the overall balance of Social Security plus Part A of Medicare by about
3.5 percentage points of taxable wages and salaries. These steps alone
are enough to finance Social Security in perpetuity. Or, they could
finance Social Security for seventy-five years and extend the life of
Part A trust fund by about three decades. Huge general revenue
liabilities for parts B and D of Medicare remain, but this package is
still a start in dealing with growing retirement costs. As said above,
the package of taxing all payrolls for Social Security and advancing the
normal retirement age is indeed strong medicine.
My approach here has been to unify proposals for
the financial reform of Social Security and Medicare on the tax side and
for retirement ages. Will the changes be pleasant or popular? No. Will
something like them, or worse, be necessary some day? Yes. We might as
well begin now thinking about those changes that seem to be the fairest
across generations.
For the complete speech and the tables and other
information presented -
Click Here
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Dr. Gramlich took office on November 5,
1997, as a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to fill an unexpired term ending January 31,
2008.
Dr. Gramlich was born on June 18, 1939, in
Rochester, New York. He received a B.A. from Williams College in
1961; his graduate study was at Yale University, from which he
received an M.A. in economics in 1962 and a Ph.D. in economics
in 1965.
Before becoming a member of the Board, Dr.
Gramlich served as Dean of the School of Public Policy at the
University of Michigan (1995-97). He also served as Professor of
Economics and Public Policy at the University of Michigan
(1976-97), Chair of the Economics Department (1983-86 and
1989-90), and Director of the Institute of Public Policy Studies
(1979-83 and 1991-95).
Dr. Gramlich has extensive governmental
experience. From 1994 to 1996 he served as Chair of the
Quadrennial Advisory Council on Social Security, a body
established to examine the actuarial finances of social security
and to suggest policy changes. From 1986 to 1987 Dr. Gramlich
was both Deputy Director and Acting Director of the
Congressional Budget Office. He also was Director of the Policy
Research Division at the Office of Economic Opportunity
(1971-73), Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution (1973-76),
and a staff member of the Research Division of the Federal
Reserve Board (1965-70).
Dr. Gramlich also has a strong research
record on a wide range of issues. In 1992 he was the staff
director for the Economic Study Commission of major league
baseball. His popular text on benefit-cost analysis is in its
second edition; he has also written several other books and many
articles on such topics as macroeconomics, budget policy, income
redistribution, fiscal federalism, social security, and the
economics of professional sports.
Dr. Gramlich and his wife Ruth have two
children, Sarah and Robert, both married, and four
grandchildren.
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