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Greenspan Likes Social Security Private Accounts,
But Urges Caution
Feb.
17, 2005 – Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said yesterday he approves the
idea of private investment accounts, but added, “…you have to do
it in a cautious, gradual way.” This remark came in a question and
answer period with the Senate Banking Committee after he made the
semi-annual presentation on the economy.
(Complete text of Greenspan testimony is below this article)
In the formal
presentation he only mentioned Social Security and Medicare in one
paragraph. He again urged Congress to take action to make the futures of
the massive entitlement programs of Social Security and Medicare more
financially secure. saying:
“Beyond the near
term, benefits promised to a burgeoning retirement-age population under
mandatory entitlement programs, most notably Social Security and
Medicare, threaten to strain the resources of the working-age population
in the years ahead. Real progress on these issues will unavoidably
entail many difficult choices. But the demographics are inexorable, and
call for action before the leading edge of baby boomer retirement
becomes evident in 2008. This is especially the case because longer-term
problems, if not addressed, could begin to affect longer-dated debt
issues, the value of which is based partly on expectations of
developments many years in the future.”
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What he said last year...
Greenspan Says Cut Social Security to Reduce Deficit
He also wants adjustments in Medicare spending
Feb. 25, 2004 - Testifying today before the House Budget Committee, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan urged cuts in Social Security to correct the problems caused by the Bush deficit.
Click here to read his testimony
Reaction:
Answers to reporters by White House Press Secretary Scott McClelland -
Click Here*
Greenspan
to Testify on Social Security to New Senate Aging Committee
Sen. Gordon Smith is confirmed as committee
chairman for 109th Congress
Jan. 6,
2005 – Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan will testify on
Social Security at a meeting of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Aging on March 7, according to an announcement by Sen. Gordon Smith,
R-Ore., who was elected committee chairman yesterday.
More... 1/06/05*
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Bush said yesterday he
has not ruled out raising taxes on those who earn more than $90,000 a
year to help bolster Social Security's finances. Under the current
system, payroll taxes are paid only on the first $90,000 in wages,
according to the Associated Press.
"The one thing I'm not
open-minded about is raising the payroll tax rate. And all the other
issues go on the table," Bush told a roundtable of regional newspapers,
according to an account Wednesday in the New Haven (Conn.) Register.
Reuters News Services reported these answers to
questions about Social Security by Greenspan during his Senate
presentation.
"...We've had in recent years some slowing down in
population growth, but a remarkable increase in life expectancy after
age 65. That's created a very major problem for a pay-as-you-go system.
"And the reason essentially is, by its nature, in
the purest form, pay-as-you-go creates no savings. It merely transfers
from taxpayers in any particular period to beneficiaries.
"Now, to be sure, there is some savings involved in
the OASI fund, in the sense of we have built up a trust fund, which is
now approximately $1.5 trillion. But fully funded would require more
than $10 trillion. So we are very far short and we have very great
difficulty in fully funding the existing system. And that's the reason
why I think we have the problems that we're running into.
"One (model) is the pay-as-you-go model, which, if
we can fully fund, will work. But it's shown very considerable
difficulty in doing that.
"The other is the forced-savings model, which in
the current context is not increasing savings, because you're switching
from the federal government to a forced-savings account. But as a
general model, it has in it the seeds of developing full funding by its
very nature. As I've said before, I've always supported moves to full
funding in the context of a private account.
"The issue with respect to the financing is a difficult one to answer,
because there are things we don't know...
"First, we don't know the extent to which the
financial markets at this stage, specifically those trading in long-term
bonds, are discounting the $10 trillion contingent liability that we
have. Actually, it's more than $10 trillion now; it's $10 trillion
awhile back.
"If indeed the financial markets do not distinguish
through most of that $10-plus trillion, and say it is just as much of a
debt as the $4-odd trillion that is a debt to the public, then, one
would say, "Well, if you wanted to go to a private system, you could go
fully to a private system without any response in interest rates
because, obviously, you're not changing the liabilities involved, you're
just merely switching assets to the private sector.
"But we don't know that. And if we were to go
forward in a large way and we were wrong, it would be creating more
difficulties than I would imagine.
"So if you're going to move to private accounts,
which I approve of, I think you have to do it in a cautious, gradual
way, and recognize that there is yet another problem involved, which is
this: Unlike almost all of the other programs with which we deal, moving
to a forced-savings account technically does not materially affect net
national savings. It merely moves savings from a government account to a
private account.
"...I do say, as I said previously, that I would be
very careful about very large increases in debt. But I do believe that
relatively small increases are not something that would concern me...I
would say over a trillion is large.
Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan
Federal Reserve Board's semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the
Congress
Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate
February 16, 2005
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am
pleased to be here today to present the
Federal Reserve's Monetary Policy Report to the Congress. In the
seven months since I last testified before this Committee, the U.S.
economic expansion has firmed, overall inflation has subsided, and core
inflation has remained low.
Over the first half of 2004, the available
information increasingly suggested that the economic expansion was
becoming less fragile and that the risk of an undesirable decline in
inflation had greatly diminished. Toward midyear, the Federal Reserve
came to the judgment that the extraordinary degree of policy
accommodation that had been in place since the middle of 2003 was no
longer warranted and, in the announcement released at the conclusion of
our May meeting, signaled that a firming of policy was likely. The
Federal Open Market Committee began to raise the federal funds rate at
its June meeting, and the announcement following that meeting indicated
the need for further, albeit gradual, withdrawal of monetary policy
stimulus.
Around the same time, incoming data suggested a
lull in activity as the economy absorbed the impact of higher energy
prices. Much as had been expected, this soft patch proved to be
short-lived. Accordingly, the Federal Reserve has followed the June
policy move with similar actions at each meeting since then, including
our most recent meeting earlier this month. The cumulative removal of
policy accommodation to date has significantly raised measures of the
real federal funds rate, but by most measures, it remains fairly low.
The evidence broadly supports the view that
economic fundamentals have steadied. Consumer spending has been well
maintained over recent months, buoyed by continued growth in disposable
personal income, gains in net worth, and accommodative conditions in
credit markets. Households have recorded a modest improvement in their
financial position over this period, to the betterment of many
indicators of credit quality. Low interest rates and rising incomes have
contributed to a decline in the aggregate household financial obligation
ratio, and delinquency and charge-off rates on various categories of
consumer loans have stayed at low levels.
The sizable gains in consumer spending of recent
years have been accompanied by a drop in the personal saving rate to an
average of only 1 percent over 2004--a very low figure relative to the
nearly 7 percent rate averaged over the previous three decades. Among
the factors contributing to the strength of spending and the decline in
saving have been developments in housing markets and home finance that
have spurred rising household wealth and allowed greater access to that
wealth. The rapid rise in home prices over the past several years has
provided households with considerable capital gains. Moreover, a
significant increase in the rate of single-family home turnover has
meant that many consumers have been able to realize gains from the sale
of their homes. To be sure, such capital gains, largely realized through
an increase in mortgage debt on the home, do not increase the pool of
national savings available to finance new capital investment. But from
the perspective of an individual household, cash realized from capital
gains has the same spending power as cash from any other source.
More broadly, rising home prices along with higher
equity prices have outpaced the rise in household, largely mortgage,
debt and have pushed up household net worth to about 5-1/2 times
disposable income by the end of last year. Although the ratio of net
worth to income is well below the peak attained in 1999, it remains
above the long-term historical average. These gains in net worth help to
explain why households in the aggregate do not appear uncomfortable with
their financial position even though their reported personal saving rate
is negligible.
Of course, household net worth may not continue to
rise relative to income, and some reversal in that ratio is not out of
the question. If that were to occur, households would probably perceive
the need to save more out of current income; the personal saving rate
would accordingly rise, and consumer spending would slow.
But while household spending may well play a
smaller role in the expansion going forward, business executives
apparently have become somewhat more optimistic in recent months.
Capital spending and corporate borrowing have firmed noticeably, but
some of the latter may have been directed to finance the recent backup
in inventories. Mergers and acquisitions, though, have clearly perked
up.
Even in the current much-improved environment,
however, some caution among business executives remains. Although
capital investment has been advancing at a reasonably good pace, it has
nonetheless lagged the exceptional rise in profits and internal cash
flow. This is most unusual; it took a deep recession to produce the last
such configuration in 1975. The lingering caution evident in capital
spending decisions has also been manifest in less-aggressive hiring by
businesses. In contrast to the typical pattern early in previous
business-cycle recoveries, firms have appeared reluctant to take on new
workers and have remained focused on cost containment.
As opposed to the lingering hesitancy among
business executives, participants in financial markets seem very
confident about the future and, judging by the exceptionally low level
of risk spreads in credit markets, quite willing to bear risk. This
apparent disparity in sentiment between business people and market
participants could reflect the heightened additional concerns of
business executives about potential legal liabilities rather than a
fundamentally different assessment of macroeconomic risks.
Turning to the outlook for costs and prices,
productivity developments will likely play a key role. The growth of
output per hour slowed over the past half year, giving a boost to unit
labor costs after two years of declines. Going forward, the implications
for inflation will be influenced by the extent and persistence of any
slowdown in productivity. A lower rate of productivity growth in the
context of relatively stable increases in average hourly compensation
has led to slightly more rapid growth in unit labor costs. Whether
inflation actually rises in the wake of slowing productivity growth,
however, will depend on the rate of growth of labor compensation and the
ability and willingness of firms to pass on higher costs to their
customers. That, in turn, will depend on the degree of utilization of
resources and how monetary policymakers respond. To date, with profit
margins already high, competitive pressures have tended to limit the
extent to which cost pressures have been reflected in higher prices.
Productivity is notoriously difficult to predict.
Neither the large surge in output per hour from the first quarter of
2003 to the second quarter of 2004, nor the more recent moderation was
easy to anticipate. It seems likely that these swings reflected delayed
efficiency gains from the capital goods boom of the 1990s. Throughout
the first half of last year, businesses were able to meet increasing
orders with management efficiencies rather than new hires. But
conceivably the backlog of untapped total efficiencies has run low,
requiring new hires. Indeed, new hires as a percent of employment rose
in the fourth quarter of last year to the highest level since the second
quarter of 2001.
There is little question that the potential remains
for large advances in productivity from further applications of existing
knowledge, and insights into applications not even now contemplated
doubtless will emerge in the years ahead. However, we have scant ability
to infer the pace at which such gains will play out and, therefore,
their implications for the growth of productivity over the longer run.
It is, of course, the rate of change of productivity over time, and not
its level, that influences the persistent changes in unit labor costs
and hence the rate of inflation.
The inflation outlook will also be shaped by
developments affecting the exchange value of the dollar and oil prices.
Although the dollar has been declining since early 2002, exporters to
the United States apparently have held dollar prices relatively steady
to preserve their market share, effectively choosing to absorb the
decline in the dollar by accepting a reduction in their profit margins.
However, the recent somewhat quickened pace of increases in U.S. import
prices suggests that profit margins of exporters to the United States
have contracted to the point where the foreign shippers may exhibit only
limited tolerance for additional reductions in margins should the dollar
decline further.
The sharp rise in oil prices over the past year has
no doubt boosted firms' costs and may have weighed on production,
particularly given the sizable permanent component of oil price
increases suggested by distant-horizon oil futures contracts. However,
the share of total business expenses attributable to energy costs has
declined appreciably over the past thirty years, which has helped to
buffer profits and the economy more generally from the adverse effect of
high oil and natural gas prices. Still, although the aggregate effect
may be modest, we must recognize that some sectors of the economy and
regions of the country have been hit hard by the increase in energy
costs, especially over the past year.
Despite the combination of somewhat slower growth
of productivity in recent quarters, higher energy prices, and a decline
in the exchange rate for the dollar, core measures of consumer prices
have registered only modest increases. The core PCE and CPI measures,
for example, climbed about 1-1/4 and 2 percent, respectively, at an
annual rate over the second half of last year.
All told, the economy seems to have entered 2005
expanding at a reasonably good pace, with inflation and inflation
expectations well anchored. On the whole, financial markets appear
to share this view. In particular, a broad array of financial indicators
convey a pervasive sense of confidence among investors and an associated
greater willingness to bear risk than is yet evident among business
managers.
Both realized and option-implied measures of
uncertainty in equity and fixed-income markets have declined markedly
over recent months to quite low levels. Credit spreads, read from
corporate bond yields and credit default swap premiums, have continued
to narrow amid widespread signs of an improvement in corporate credit
quality, including notable drops in corporate bond defaults and debt
ratings downgrades. Moreover, recent surveys suggest that bank lending
officers have further eased standards and terms on business loans, and
anecdotal reports suggest that securities dealers and other
market-makers appear quite willing to commit capital in providing market
liquidity.
In this environment, long-term interest rates have
trended lower in recent months even as the Federal Reserve has raised
the level of the target federal funds rate by 150 basis points. This
development contrasts with most experience, which suggests that, other
things being equal, increasing short-term interest rates are normally
accompanied by a rise in longer-term yields. The simple mathematics of
the yield curve governs the relationship between short- and long-term
interest rates. Ten-year yields, for example, can be thought of as an
average of ten consecutive one-year forward rates. A rise in the
first-year forward rate, which correlates closely with the federal funds
rate, would increase the yield on ten-year U.S. Treasury notes even if
the more-distant forward rates remain unchanged. Historically, though,
even these distant forward rates have tended to rise in association with
monetary policy tightening.
In the current episode, however, the more-distant
forward rates declined at the same time that short-term rates were
rising. Indeed, the tenth-year tranche, which yielded 6-1/2 percent last
June, is now at about 5-1/4 percent. During the same period, comparable
real forward rates derived from quotes on Treasury inflation-indexed
debt fell significantly as well, suggesting that only a portion of the
decline in nominal forward rates in distant tranches is attributable to
a drop in long-term inflation expectations.
Some analysts have worried that the dip in forward
real interest rates since last June may indicate that market
participants have marked down their view of economic growth going
forward, perhaps because of the rise in oil prices. But this
interpretation does not mesh seamlessly with the rise in stock prices
and the narrowing of credit spreads observed over the same interval.
Others have emphasized the subdued overall business demand for credit in
the United States and the apparent eagerness of lenders, including
foreign investors, to provide financing. In particular, heavy purchases
of longer-term Treasury securities by foreign central banks have often
been cited as a factor boosting bond prices and pulling down longer-term
yields. Thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage rates have dropped to a level
only a little higher than the record lows touched in 2003 and, as a
consequence, the estimated average duration of outstanding
mortgage-backed securities has shortened appreciably over recent months.
Attempts by mortgage investors to offset this decline in duration by
purchasing longer-term securities may be yet another contributor to the
recent downward pressure on longer-term yields.
But we should be careful in endeavoring to account
for the decline in long-term interest rates by adverting to technical
factors in the United States alone because yields and risk spreads have
narrowed globally. The German ten-year Bund rate, for example, has
declined from 4-1/4 percent last June to current levels of 3-1/2
percent. And spreads of yields on bonds issued by emerging-market
nations over U.S. Treasury yields have declined to very low levels.
There is little doubt that, with the breakup of the
Soviet Union and the integration of China and India into the global
trading market, more of the world's productive capacity is being tapped
to satisfy global demands for goods and services. Concurrently, greater
integration of financial markets has meant that a larger share of the
world's pool of savings is being deployed in cross-border financing of
investment. The favorable inflation performance across a broad range of
countries resulting from enlarged global goods, services and financial
capacity has doubtless contributed to expectations of lower inflation in
the years ahead and lower inflation risk premiums. But none of this is
new and hence it is difficult to attribute the long-term interest rate
declines of the last nine months to glacially increasing globalization.
For the moment, the broadly unanticipated behavior of world bond markets
remains a conundrum. Bond price movements may be a short-term
aberration, but it will be some time before we are able to better judge
the forces underlying recent experience.
This is but one of many uncertainties that will
confront world policymakers. Over the past two decades, the industrial
world has fended off two severe stock market corrections, a major
financial crisis in developing nations, corporate scandals, and, of
course, the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Yet overall economic activity
experienced only modest difficulties. In the United States, only five
quarters in the past twenty years exhibited declines in GDP, and those
declines were small. Thus, it is not altogether unexpected or irrational
that participants in the world marketplace would project more of the
same going forward.
Yet history cautions that people experiencing long
periods of relative stability are prone to excess. We must thus remain
vigilant against complacency, especially since several important
economic challenges confront policymakers in the years ahead.
Prominent among these challenges in the United
States is the pressing need to maintain the flexibility of our economic
and financial system. This will be essential if we are to address our
current account deficit without significant disruption. Besides market
pressures, which appear poised to stabilize and over the longer run
possibly to decrease the U.S. current account deficit and its attendant
financing requirements, some forces in the domestic U.S. economy seem
about to head in the same direction. Central to that adjustment must be
an increase in net national saving. This serves to underscore the
imperative to restore fiscal discipline.
Beyond the
near term, benefits promised to a burgeoning retirement-age population
under mandatory entitlement programs, most notably Social Security and
Medicare, threaten to strain the resources of the working-age population
in the years ahead. Real progress on these issues will unavoidably
entail many difficult choices. But the demographics are inexorable, and
call for action before the leading edge of baby boomer retirement
becomes evident in 2008. This is especially the case because longer-term
problems, if not addressed, could begin to affect longer-dated debt
issues, the value of which is based partly on expectations of
developments many years in the future.
Another critical long-run economic challenge facing
the United States is the need to ensure that our workforce is equipped
with the requisite skills to compete effectively in an environment of
rapid technological progress and global competition. Technological
advance is continually altering the shape, nature, and complexity of our
economic processes. But technology and, more recently, competition from
abroad have grown to a point at which demand for the least-skilled
workers in the United States and other developed countries is
diminishing, placing downward pressure on their wages. These workers
will need to acquire the skills required to compete effectively for the
new jobs that our economy will create.
At the risk of some oversimplification, if the
skill composition of our workforce meshed fully with the needs of our
increasingly complex capital stock, wage-skill differentials would be
stable, and percentage changes in wage rates would be the same for all
job grades. But for the past twenty years, the supply of skilled,
particularly highly skilled, workers has failed to keep up with a
persistent rise in the demand for such skills. Conversely, the demand
for lesser-skilled workers has declined, especially in response to
growing international competition. The failure of our society to enhance
the skills of a significant segment of our workforce has left a
disproportionate share with lesser skills. The effect, of course, is to
widen the wage gap between the skilled and the lesser skilled.
In a democratic society, such a stark bifurcation
of wealth and income trends among large segments of the population can
fuel resentment and political polarization. These social developments
can lead to political clashes and misguided economic policies that work
to the detriment of the economy and society as a whole. As I have noted
on previous occasions, strengthening elementary and secondary schooling
in the United States--especially in the core disciplines of math,
science, and written and verbal communications--is one crucial element
in avoiding such outcomes. We need to reduce the relative excess of
lesser-skilled workers and enhance the number of skilled workers by
expediting the acquisition of skills by all students, both through
formal education and on-the-job training.
Although the long-run challenges confronting the
U.S. economy are significant, I fully anticipate that they will
ultimately be met and resolved. In recent decades our nation has
demonstrated remarkable resilience and flexibility when tested by
events, and we have every reason to be confident that it will weather
future challenges as well. For our part, the Federal Reserve will pursue
its statutory objectives of price stability and maximum sustainable
employment--the latter of which we have learned can best be achieved in
the long run by maintaining price stability. This is the surest
contribution that the Federal Reserve can make in fostering the economic
prosperity and well-being of our nation and its people.
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